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Truax: Why Can't the Football Team Read: The Student Athlete's Right-toWHY CAN'T THE FOOTBALL TEAM READ?: THE STUDENT
ATHLETE'S RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT AND THE
GROWING THREAT OF LIABILITY
CHRIS TRUAX*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Athletes arejust plantationslaves. They're given passing grades
to earn money for the plantation. Then, when the athlete's service
to the plantation is over, no one cares if he or she has made progress as a student.1
College athletics are big business. The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) earns over $140,000,000 a year from
the sale of broadcast rights for NCAA championships alone. 2 When
coupled with the sale of other broadcast rights, merchandising tieins and ticket sales, a successful athletic program can be a valuable
source of revenue.
There is a growing public perception that universities have
come to define "success" solely in terms of winning games and that
the education of student-athletes is, at best, a peripheral concern.
Unfortunately, many of the available data reinforce this perception.
One study, conducted by the General Accounting Office, showed
that at thirty-five of ninety-seven schools with major men's basketball programs, fewer than twenty percent of players graduate within
six years of enrollment. Only eight schools had graduation rates
above 80%.3
* J.D., magna cum laude, 1995, Notre Dame Law School; LL.M.(Hons) 1996,
Queens' College, University of Cambridge. ctruax@lexlaw.com
1. Myles Gordon, Making the Grade?, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, May 1, 1992, at 20
(quoting Jan Kemp, professor at University of Georgia who has studied treatment
of athletes at University of Georgia).
2. Leonard Shapiro, March Madness: Follow the Money, WASH. POST, March 11,
1994, at C2.
3. See Irvin Molotsky, No More Than 1 in 5 Athletes Graduatingat Many Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1989, at 1. Statistics published by the NCAA suggest that
student-athletes actually graduate at a higher rate than that of the general student
body. See GraduationRates Remain Steady, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1994 at A65. The NCAA
report claims that 57% of all athletes entering Division I schools in the 1987-88
academic year graduated within six years, compared with a 56% rate for non-athletes. These statistics are misleading, however, because they combine rates for athletes participating in such sports as crew and fencing with those for athletes
playing on the football and basketball teams. In addition, they say nothing about
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The public conception of what constitutes a successful athletic
program to universities, coupled with the lucrative nature of university athletics, creates an ideal atmosphere for student-athletes seeking legal redress against universities for their failure to foster
academic achievement for student athletes. Despite numerous attempts, however, student-athletes have generally been unable to ad4
vance a legal theory which a court will recognize.
Two recent developments may significantly alter this imbalance of power. Ross v. Creighton5 and the Student-Athlete's Right-toKnow Act (the Act) 6 combine to provide student-athletes with po-

tentially formidable legal theories, which could result in significant
liability for many colleges and universities.
The Act, enacted by Congress in 1991, seeks to minimize the
exploitation of student-athletes by requiring institutions to disclose
graduation rates for athletes to potential recruits. Though the Act
itself contains no penalties for non-compliance, it may create a new
cause of action for aggrieved student-athletes.
Ross v. Creighton7, by contrast, does not recognize a new cause
of action, but rather holds that a breach of contract action may be
brought against a university when it fails to perform specific
promises made to a student-athlete during the recruiting process.,
Standing alone, Ross represents a significant victory for student-athletes. More importantly, the synergism between Ross and the Act9
individual schools. For example, the NCAA statistics for classes entering Division I
schools in 1983-84 and 1984-85 reveal that at Texas A&M, 67% of the general student body graduated within six years while only 25% of the football team graduated. See Tim Layden, College Football '92 Bowls, Polls and Lofty Goals, NEWSDAY, Aug.
23, 1992, at 16. Critics have also pointed out that the statistics for entering classes
include part-time students who take more than six years to earn a degree, whereas
student-athletes have been full-time students for four years. In other words, graduation rates for the general student body are artificially low because of the large
component of part-time students in many colleges, many of whom take more than
six years to graduate. California State University students, for example, take an
average of five and one-half years to graduate. See Ralph Frammolino, Wilson Calls
for Reforms in College System, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at A3. While statistics are not
available, it has also been argued that almost 100% of members of the general
student body spending four years as full-time students will graduate within six
years. Finally, at least one study has called into question the veracity of the graduation statistics reported to the NCAA. See Steve Stecklow, Cheat Sheets: Colleges Inflate
SATs and GraduationRates in Popular Guidebooks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at Al.
4. See Timothy Davis, Examining EducationalMalpracticeJurisprudence:Should a
Cause of Action be Createdfor Student Athletes?, 69 DENy. U. L. REv. 57 (1992).
5. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (1996).
7. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
8. See infra Part III for a further discussion of such a breach of contract action.
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (1996).
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creates an entirely new legal environment for athletic recruiting.
Part II of this article discusses the Act and the possible tort remedy
of "failure to inform" which may flow from it.' ° Part III analyzes the
elements of the tort of a "failure to inform.""1 Part IV discusses Ross
and its potential synergism with the Act. 12 Defenses under the Act
and strategies for avoiding liability are discussed in Parts V and VI
13
respectively.
II.

CREATING A NEW TORT

Traditionally, courts have refused to recognize student claims
for "educational malpractice" because of the difficulty in fashioning a standard of care.' 4 The same is true for "negligent admission." 15 This difficulty stems from the courts' perception that
"different but acceptable scientific methods of academic training
[make] it unfeasible to formulate a standard by which to judge the
16
conduct of those delivering the services."'
The Act creates a duty to disclose on the part of colleges and
universities which future plaintiffs may use to supply a hook on
which courts may hang a new tort of "failure to inform." The Act,
which became operative on July 1, 1992, provides that any institution at which students receive federal financial aid must disclose
information on graduation rates broken down by race, sex and
sport to potential student-athletes. 17 The Act further provides that
10. See infra notes 14-51 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 52-83 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 84-115 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 116-133 and 134-135 respectively and accompanying text.
14. See Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). At least eleven states
have explicitly rejected claims for educational malpractice: Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin. For a list of cases, see id. at 414 n.2.
15. "Negligent admission" refers to an institution violating a duty to admit
only "reasonably qualified students" with the ability to academically perform. See
id. at 415.
16. Id. at 414 (citations omitted).
17. The text of the Act appears at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (1996) and is reproduced below.
(e) Disclosures required with respect to athletically related student aid.
(1) Each institution of higher education which participates in any
program under this subchapter I of Chapter 34 of Title 42 and is
attended by students receiving athletically related student aid
shall annually submit a report to the Secretary which contains(A) the number of students at the institution of higher education who received athletically related student aid broken
down by race and sex in the following sports: basketball,
football, baseball, cross country/track and all other sports
combined;
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(B) the number of students at the institution of higher education, broken down by race and sex;
(C) the completion or graduation rate for students at the institution of higher education who received athletically related
student aid broken down by race and sex in the following
sports: basketball, football, baseball, cross country/track
and all other sports combined;
(D) the completion or graduation rate for students at the institution of higher education broken down by race and sex;
(E) the average completion or graduation rate for the 4 most
recent completing or graduating classes of students at the
institution of higher education who received athletically related student aid broken down by race and sex in the following categories: basketball, football, baseball, cross country/
track and all other sports combined; and
(F) the average completion or graduation rate for the 4 most
recent completing or graduating classes of students at the
institute of higher education broken down by race and sex.
When an institution described in paragraph (1) of this subsection offers a potential student athlete athletically related student
aid, such institution shall provide to the student and his parents,
his guidance counselor, and coach the information contained in
the report submitted by such institution pursuant to paragraph
(1).
For purposes of this subsection, institutions may exclude from
the reporting requirements under paragraphs (1) and (2) the
completion or graduation rates of students and student athletes
who leave school to serve in the armed services, on official
church missions, or with a recognized foreign aid service of the
Federal Government.
Each institution of higher education described in paragraph (1)
may provide supplemental information to students and the Secretary showing the completion or graduation rate when such
completion or graduation rate includes students transferring
into and out of such institution.
The Secretary, using the reports submitted under this subsection, shall compile and publish a report containing the information required under paragraph (1) broken down by(A) individual institutions of higher education; and
(B) athletic conferences recognized by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association and the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.
The Secretary shall waive the requirements of this subsection for
any institution of higher education that is a member of an athletic association or athletic conference that has voluntarily published completion or graduation rate data or has agreed to
publish data that, in the opinion of the Secretary, is substantially
comparable to the information required under this subsection.
The Secretary, in conjunction with the National Junior College
Athletic Association, shall develop and obtain data on completion or graduation rates from two-year colleges that award athletically related student aid. Such data shall, to the extent
practicable, be consistent with the reporting requirements set
forth in this section.
For purposes of the subsection, the term "athletically related student aid" means any scholarship, grant, or other form of financial assistance the terms of which require the recipient to
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the institution must forward the information annually to the Secretary of Education, who is required to publish a report.1 8
While the Act provides no penalties for non-compliance, it
does create a statutory duty to disclose graduation rates to potential
student-athletes. The failure of an institution to comply with a statutory requirement may give rise to a cause of action sounding in
tort. When a legislature creates a duty which did not exist at common law, it creates the potential for a new tort as well. 19 To determine whether or not to create the new tort, the court undertakes a
two-prong analysis. In the first prong, the court must determine
whether the plaintiff and the plaintiff's injury fall within the ambit
of the statute as a matter of law. 20 In the second prong, the court
21
must decide whether to grant relief as a matter of public policy.
In addition, the court must consider causation issues, whether the
university's failure to inform the student-athlete is the cause of the
student-athlete's failure to acquire a satisfactory education.
To satisfy the first prong, the court must determine both
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class intended to be protected by the statute and whether the statute was intended to prevent the claimed injury. 22 A student-athlete attempting to recover
in tort should have little trouble in satisfying both of these elements. As the Act only creates a duty toward potential student-athletes offered athletic scholarships, student-athletes are specifically
designated as the protected class. In addition, the root injury
claimed in a suit for "failure to inform" is that the plaintiff failed to
receive a satisfactory education. Since the Act's findings focus specifically on the poor academic performance of student-athletes, 23
the plaintiffs failure to obtain a degree is one of the harms the
statute intends to prevent. The student-athlete, however, still needs
to prove that the university's failure to inform is the cause of their
failure to acquire a satisfactory education.
participate in a program of intercollegiate athletics at an institution of higher education in order to be eligible to receive such
assistance.
20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (1996).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1902(e) (5) (1996).
19. See W.

PAGE KEETON

ET AL.,

PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 36, at 221 & n.8 (5th ed. 1984).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

874A cmt.

i (1979).

21. See id. cmt. h.
22. See id. cmt. i.
23. "[T] he academic performance of student athletes, especially those receiving football and basketball scholarships, has been a source of great concern in
recent years." Act of Nov. 8, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-542, § 101, 104 Stat. 2381, 2381
(1990).
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Given that both the plaintiff and the injury are covered by the
statute, the court must next determine whether, as a matter of policy, it should grant relief and create a new tort. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts lists six factors a court should consider in determining whether a new tort should be created: 1) the specificity of
the legislative provision; 2) the adequacy of existing remedies; 3)
the extent to which the tort would supplement or interfere with
existing remedies or enforcement; 4) the importance of the interest
protected; 5) the extent of the change in tort law; and 6) the burden the new cause of action will place on judicial resources. 24 The
result of an analysis of these six factors weighs in favor of creating a
new cause of action for the student-athletes.
A.

The Specificity of the Legislation

The test used for this first factor is whether the legislation is
clear in letting both the court and the actor know what conduct is
prohibited or required.2 5 The Act is quite specific. In addition to
detailing exactly what information must be compiled, 26 it provides
that the university must furnish a copy of the report not only to the
potential student-athlete, but to his or her parents, coach and high27
school guidance counsellor as well.

B.

The Adequacy of Existing Remedies and the Threat of
Interference With Them

An analysis of the second and third factors provides that there
simply are no existing remedies for the injury, and, therefore, no
potential interference from recognizing a new cause of action. Despite numerous attempts, student-athletes have been unable to convince courts to recognize a cause of action, much less provide a
remedy. 28 Furthermore, recognizing a tort of "failure to inform"
would not interfere with enforcement provisions in the Act itself.
In this respect, the Act differs markedly from the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).29 FERPA creates a right to review
educational records, 30 to challenge their content under certain
24. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 874A cmt. h (1979).

25. See id. cmt. h(1).
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (1) (1996).
27. See id. § 1092(e) (2).
28. See generally Davis, supra note 4 for additional information concerning
these prior attempts to recognize a cause of action.
29. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1996).
30. See id. § 1232(g)(a)(1)(A).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/4
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conditions3 1 and to prevent their release.3 2 Provisions of FERPA
provide that educational institutions not in compliance can be denied federal funding. 33 As a result of these provisions, courts have
consistently held that this is the exclusive remedy available under
FERPA.3 4 The Act, by contrast, contains no enforcement provisions
whatsoever. 35 Thus, there is neither a statutory nor a common law
remedy with which a new cause of action could interfere.
C.

The Importance of the Interest Protected

In passing the Act, Congress noted in its findings that
"[e] ducation is fundamental to the development of individual citizens and the progress of the Nation as a whole." 36 It also found
that "[m]ore than 10,000 athletic scholarships are provided annually by institutions of higher education. ' 37 Thus, Congress intended for the Act to vindicate an interest critical to society.
Education is even more critical from the perspective of the individual. Aside from any metaphysical benefits, those with college
degrees generally have greater earning potential than those without,38 although this distinction is irrelevant when considering the

salaries of professional athletes. Courts uniformly recognize impaired earning capacity as a protectable interest. 39 Thus, the forth
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. § 1 2 32(g) (a) (2).
See id. § 1232(g)(b).
See id. § 12 32(g) (a) (1)-(2), (b)(1).
See, e.g., Girardierv. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1977).

Note, however, that some courts have held that while there is no private right of
action under FERPA, it does create a right that can be vindicated in an action for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802
F.2d 21 (2nd Cir. 1986). A discussion of the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the
Act is beyond the scope of this article.
35. This, by itself, suggests that Congress may have intended to create a private federal right of action under the Act in keeping with the maxim Ubi jus, ibi
remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy). In any event, the tort of
"failure to inform" is a creature of state common law. Thus, its existence does not
depend wholly on a Congressional intent to allow private enforcement of the Act.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. g (1979).
36. Act of Nov. 8, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-542, § 102, 104 Stat. 2381, 2381
(1990).
37. Id. § 102(5) at 2381.
38. College graduates earn an average of 99% more than those who have only
graduated from high school. See Kerry Hannon, How You're Getting Stiffed by the
Student Loan Mess, MONEY, May 1992, at 164. This gap is growing. In the 1980's,
real average family income for adults in their prime earning years (age 22-48) grew
more than twice as fast for college graduates than it did for those who were not.
See Stephen J. Rose, Declining Family Incomes in the 1980's, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec.
1993 at 29.
39. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1(2), at 649-50 (2d ed. 1993).
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factor to be considered by the court weighs in favor of creating the
new tort.
D.

The Extent of the Change in Tort Law

The new tort is very similar to a number of other recognized
causes of action. 40 A court could reach much the same result of
other causes of action by recognizing the existence of a confidential
relationship between an educational institution and a potential student-athlete. Such a relationship creates a duty to disclose material
information 41 and exists whenever "one party to a transaction justifiably believes the other is looking out for his interests."4 2 Failure
to disclose under these circumstances will support an action for
deceit.
A recent case, Sperau v. Ford Motor Company,43 presented a situation remarkably similar to one that might arise under the Act. In
Sperau, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff based on failure to disclose in a confidential relationship. 44 Ford heavily recruited the plaintiff, a minority, to become a
Ford franchisee. 45 Ford knew, but failed to disclose to the plaintiff,
that minority-owned franchises had a much higher failure rate than
the average Ford franchise. 4 6 On appeal, Ford argued both that
failure rates for its franchises, broken down by race, were not material and that even if such rates were material, Ford had no duty to
47
disclose them in an arm's-length business transaction.
The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that "race based" failure rates were material. 4 8 In addition, the
court found ample evidence (especially regarding Ford's intense
recruitment of Sperau) from which a jury could determine the
40. The tort of deceit is an example of a similar cause of action.
41. Material information that a tort for failure to inform would create a duty
to disclose might include, for example, graduation rates of prior student-athletes
and the percentage of those student-athletes who continue on to post graduate
studies.
42.

JOHN D. CALAMAR

&JOSEPH

M.

PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS

§

9-20, at

369-70 (3d ed. 1987).
43. 674 So. 2d 24 (Ala. 1995), cert. granted, vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996).
44. 674 So. 2d 24 (Ala. 1995).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 29-31.
48. See id.
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existence of a confidential relationship between Ford and the
plaintiffs.

49

Future student-athlete plaintiffs will likely seek to bring similar
causes of action. Indeed, merely substituting "athlete" for "franchisee" in the foregoing synopsis suggests that many student-athletes to whom graduation rates have not been disclosed may have a
cause of action materially indistinguishable from that in Sperau. Arguably, it will be even easier for student-athlete plaintiffs to establish a confidential relationship, as collegiate athletic recruiting is
not generally thought of as an "arm's length business
transaction. "50
E.

The Burden the New Cause of Action Will Place on
Judicial Resources

Courts' hesitancy to recognize causes of action brought by student-athletes for inadequate education stems partly from solicitude
for judicial resources. 5 1 Unlike "negligent admission" or "educational malpractice", the new tort would not require the court to
determine the appropriate standard of care. Problems, however,
arising out of proving causation will burden judicial resources to
some extent due to the nature of the action. Admittedly, it will be
difficult to establish a causal link between the failure of the university to inform the student-athlete and the student-athlete's failure to
acquire an adequate education. Thus, it is questionable whether
the new tort would represent more of a drain on judicial resources
than professional malpractice or even ordinary negligence. This
conclusion is based on a balancing of the burdens placed on the
court. While the court will have to determine the causation issue, it
will not have to determine the appropriate standard of care.
III.
A.

"FAILURE

TO INFORM"

Elements of the Cause of Action

The foregoing discussion suggests that recognizing a duty toward potential student-athletes based on the Act is well within the
sphere of judicial prerogative. What, then, must a student-athlete
prove to recover under the new tort? Assume the following hypothetical. Universities X and Y recruit student A to play basketball.
49. See Sperau, 674 So. 2d at 29-31.
50. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
51. "A final reason courts have cited for denying this cause of action is that it
threatens to embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day operations of
schools." (citations omitted). Ross, 957 F.2d at 414.
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University X successfully recruits A but fails to provide any information that the Act requires. A plays out four years of eligibility, but is
academically disqualified at the end of the fifth year.
As a threshold element, A must show that X is bound by the
Act, in that X received federal student aid and offered A "athletically related student aid." Assuming that the Act binds University
X, it will then have a duty of disclosure to A, as well as a duty to
provide information to A's parents, high school guidance counsellor and coach. 5 2 Since the new tort involves the breach of a duty
owed to A, it can be analyzed in the same manner as a negligence
cause of action. 5 3 To prevail, therefore, A must demonstrate that
the institution violated the Act and that but for the violation, A
more probably than not, would have received a degree.
The first element is no more difficult to prove than any other
question of fact. X either complied with the Act or it did not. Since
the Act is quite specific as to who must receive the information, 54 A
should have little difficulty demonstrating that X did not comply
with the Act if the required disclosures were not made.
Cause-in-fact, however, poses a more difficult problem. A must
show both that, more probably than not, but for X's failure to comply with the Act, A would have chosen Y, and had A done so, A
would more probably than not have received a degree. Taking
these issues in reverse order. A may be able to carry the burden of
proof if the graduation rates for similarly situated student-athletes
are sufficiently disparate. 55 If, for example, X graduates ten percent of its student-athletes while Y graduates ninety percent, A,
more probably than not, would have graduated had A attended
University Y.56 While these statistics will be considered by the court
52. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (2) (1996).
53. While a cause of action for deceit based on the University's duty to disclose graduation rates to A could also be made out, a theory of negligence is preferable. Though it may make little practical difference in this context, deceit often
requires both scienter and intent. See KEETON supra note 19, § 105 at 728.
54. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
55. In some respects, this problem is analogous to medical malpractice cases
in which there is a probability that the eventual injury would have occurred even in
the absence of negligence. The traditional rule allows for recovery only when the
risk of injury has been increased from under 50% to over 50%. The author suggests that the mathematically better rule would allow recovery whenever the risk of
injury has been more than doubled by the defendant's conduct. For a critique of
the traditional rule, see Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.
1983).
56. In Ross, the court was concerned that "it may be a 'practical impossibility
[to] prov[e] that the alleged malpractice of the teacher proximately caused the
learning deficiency of the plaintiff student."' Ross, 410 F.2d at 414 citingDonohuev.
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (N.Y. 1979) (Wachtler, J.,
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in determining whether causation is proven, they will not, in and of
themselves, be determinative in resolving the causation issue.
The more interesting issue is whether A would have chosen Y
instead of X, had X complied with the Act. This can be assessed
under either an objective or a subjective standard. The plaintiff will
be arguing for the former while the defendant will argue for the
latter. Given the small number of student-athletes who are able to
turn professional, 5 7 the student-athlete choosing under the objective standard would act as a reasonably prudent person and almost
always choose the institution which offered the best opportunity to
obtain a degree, especially when, as here, there is a great disparity
in graduation rates. Thus, the objective standard operates under
the assumption that the goal of the student-athlete is to obtain a
degree. Conversely, the defendant would argue for the subjective
standard. In other words, the defendant would argue the plaintiff
would have chosen to "go for the glory" and hope to turn professional rather than opt for the less glamorous but more certain college degree, even if probability of the student-athlete turning
professional is minimal at best.
The better course would be for the courts to apply the objective standard. The raison d'etre of the Act is to enable potential student-athletes to make an "informed judgment."5 8 In addition, the
requirement that the information be sent to the student's parents,
guidance counsellor and coach 59 strongly suggests that the Act envisions a reasonably prudent decision.
It appears, then, that an action brought for "failure to inform"
will present few contestable issues. Ignoring the question of damages and assuming the court adopts the objective standard for causation, the only questions of fact open to dispute are whether the
institution complied with the Act and whether the plaintiff received
concurring). Note that this is not an issue here as the injury to the plaintiff does
not flow from educational misfeasance but rather from the plaintiff's failure to
attend an institution at which the plaintiff, more likely than not, would receive a
degree.
57. Statistics released by the National Federation of State High School Associations indicate that only about 2% of college athletes who play basketball, football or baseball will ever sign a professional contract. In basketball, for example,
even a starting player at a Division I school has only about a 3.5% chance of ever
actually playing on an NBA team. See Darrell Lang, How Many Athletes Make It to the
Pros? CuRRENT HEALTH, Jan. 1992 at 16.
58. "[K] nowledge of graduation rates would help prospective student-athletes
make an informed judgment about the educational benefits available at a given
institution of higher education." Act of Nov. 8, 1990, Pub. L. 101-542, 104 Stat.
2381, 2381.
59. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (2) (Supp. IV 1992).
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an offer from another institution with sufficiently disparate graduation rates. Conceivably, an institution might attack the applicability
of the graduation statistics to A. It might, for example, argue that A
has a learning disability which would have prevented A from receiving a degree even, if A attended the institution with the higher
graduation rates. There are several problems with this strategy.
First, since it is a purely factual question, such an argument would
not prevent the plaintiff from reaching a jury. It must therefore be
handled with extreme delicacy, as it may create the inference that A
was being intentionally exploited by the defendant. At the very
least, it raises the question of when the institution knew or should
have known about A's disability. In addition, many cases will not
present the factual basis on which to make this argument.
Second, by arguing that the plaintiff would have been unable
to receive a degree from any university, the defense may be admit60
ting a critical element of a Ross-type claim for breach of contract.
In the extreme case, a student-athlete plaintiff might be entitled to
judgment on the pleadings if he or she also seeks to void the
61
contract.
A defendant university may also be denied its most obvious and
potentially effective affirmative defense: the plaintiff's contributory
negligence. The defense is not available when a defendant's negligence has been "willful." 62 Thus, a university which intentionally

violates the Act will not be able to set up the plaintiffs failure to
study as a defense, although the plaintiffs failure to study will be
invoked in the causation analysis. In jurisdictions with pure comparative negligence, the student-athlete's bad study habits will not
be a complete bar to recovery even if the university's failure to com63
ply with the Act was due to only ordinary negligence.
Another affirmative defense that a university may assert is the
doctrine of avoidable consequences. Under this defense, the plain60. See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements in a Ross-type claim.
61. See id. This may be true even if the university had no knowledge of the
plaintiff's condition at the time the plaintiff was recruited. If both parties contemplated that the plaintiff would be able to receive an education when, in fact, he or
she was unable to do so, there would be a mutual mistake of fact and the contract
could be voided at the plaintiffs option. This, of course, raises the possibility of
other defenses which are beyond the scope of this Article. See CALAMAmi & PERILLo
supra note 42, § 9-26 at 379.
62. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 65 at 462.
63. The plaintiff student-athlete may recover substantial damages even if he
or she was much more at fault than was the university. See id. § 67 at 471-73.
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tiff is required to use "reasonable efforts to mitigate damages." 64
The effort to mitigate must only be reasonable: there is no requirement that the efforts be successful. 65 There are two exceptions to
67
the doctrine: leases of real property66 and non-exclusive contracts.
These exceptions would not apply here, as the contract between the
student-athlete and the university is exclusive. The university,
therefore, would assert that the plaintiff failed to mitigate the university's failure to inform by not researching the graduation rates
for themselves or by studying enough to insure that the plaintiff
would graduate. A student-athlete plaintiff could easily circumvent
this defense by showing "reasonable" efforts to mitigate; it is not
necessary that the plaintiff graduated from the university. Thus,
the determination would turn on what efforts the court would
68
deem reasonable.
Ironically, the line of cases barring student-athletes from recovering for "educational malpractice" may now, in turn, bar universities from establishing contributory negligence. Contributory
negligence, as well as the doctrine of avoidable consequences, are
affirmative defenses and must be established by the defendant. 69
Defendant universities, then, must now face the twin hurdles of establishing a standard of care 70 and proximate cause previously reserved for student-athlete plaintiffs. The university will argue that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for failing to follow its educational guidelines, e.g., attend class, do homework, et cetra. Contributory negligence, however, is subject to the same principles of
causation as ordinary negligence. 7 1 Thus, the defendant must
prove that the plaintiff would have received a degree had he or she
followed the guidelines. In other words, the university must prove
the efficacy of its educational system, an inquiry courts have almost
uniformly refused to make. 72 If the court does allow the university
to prove the plaintiff's negligence, it will be in the anomalous posi64. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 14-15 at 611.

65. See id.
66. See id. at 612.
67. See id., § 14-16 at 613.
68. See id., § 14-15 at 611. "Under the rule of reasonableness, the wronged
party need not act if the cost of avoidance would involve unreasonable expense."
Id. (citations omitted).
69.
70.
dard of
71.

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 65 at 451.
See supranote 17 and accompanying text for further discussion of the stancare.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 65 at 456.

72. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 414.
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tion of allowing the defendant to defend its educational techniques
while refusing the plaintiff the opportunity to challenge them.
B.

Damage Issues

As the facts in a given case may support a variety of causes of
action, a range of measures of damages may be available. 73 While a

full treatment of damages is beyond the scope of this Article, the
following represents a survey of some of the more important issues.
1. Punitive Damages
The main advantage of a tort cause of action over one in contract is the availability of punitive damages. Punitive damages may
be awarded when the defendant's act was "deliberately wrongful"
and "known to be injurious to another." 74 Thus, punitive damages
should be available to student-athlete plaintiffs whenever the institution is aware of the Act but has a policy of non-compliance.
It may also be the case, however, that while the institution has
no policy of non-compliance, individual coaches and recruiters may
choose not to comply. In general, the institution would still be liable for any punitive damages assessed, as the majority of courts have
held employers vicariously liable for punitive damages assessed
against employees. 75 A number of the remainder will hold the employer vicariously liable if the employee is in a management position. 76 Thus, the "deliberately wrongful" acts of a head coach who
actively recruits student-athletes may trigger an institution's liability
for punitive damages.
Any punitive damage awards made are likely to be quite large.
Punitive damages are designed not to compensate the plaintiff but
to deter the defendant. 7 7 Thus, it is proper to examine not only
the benefit derived from the tortious activity, 7 8 but the financial position of the defendant as well. 79 An institution with a policy of

non-compliance with the Act could, therefore, be assessed punitive
damages as a percentage of its net athletic revenue for the sport in
which the plaintiff participated, rather than merely as a multiple of
the plaintiffs compensatory damages.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 105 at 734-35.
Id. § 2 at 10 & n.24.
See id. § 2 at 13.
See DOBBS, supra note 39, § 3.11(6) at 334.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 2 at 9.
See DOBBS, supra note 39, § 3.11(14) at 353.

79. See Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship To Defendant's Wealth As Factor In Determining Propriety Of Award, 87 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1991).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/4

14

19971
2.

Truax: Why
Can't
the Football
Read: The TEAM
Student Athlete's
WHY
CAN'T
THE Team
FOOTBALL
READ? Right-to-

315

The Aleatory PerformanceProblem

When a student-athlete plaintiff suing for "failure to inform"
can demonstrate that "but for" the university's breach, he or she
would, more likely than not, have received a degree, there should
be full recovery of the value of the degree.8 0 In many cases, however, a plaintiff will only be able to demonstrate that the university's
breach decreased his chances of receiving a degree.8 1 The value of
a chance is, in general, only recoverable if the performance due is
to be aleatory, that is, if performance is predicated on an event beyond the control of the parties.8 2 To illustrate, suppose the plaintiff
purchases a lottery ticket. Subsequently, the lottery is canceled because too few tickets have been sold. The plaintiff is entitled to
recover his pro-rata share of the prizes that were to be offered. If,
for example, the prize is $1000 but only 100 tickets have been sold
at one dollar each, the plaintiff will recover ten dollars.
Regardless of the proceeding analysis, the problem facing potential student-athlete plaintiffs is that earning a degree is not like
winning the lottery; a student's academic performance is largely
within his or her control. Thus, the performance would not be
aleatory and, presumably, the value of the chance to earn a degree
83
would not be recoverable.
IV.

CONTRACT THEORIES

The disclosure provisions of the Act will put many athletic
recruiters on the horns of a dilemma. If they fail to disclose their
universities' graduation rates, their universities may be liable in
tort. If, on the other hand, they do disclose but try to do "damage
80. Courts often calculate the present value of a college degree, usually in the
context of a divorce proceeding. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 448 N.W.2d 735 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989).
81. For example, suppose A, a potential student-athlete, had a choice between
University X with a 10% graduation rate and University Y with a 40% graduation
rate. While A has a significantly greater chance of graduating from University Y,
there is only a 33% probability that A's failure to graduate was caused by A's failure
to attend University Y. In other words, A cannot show A's failure to graduate was
more likely than not a result of attending University X because there is a 60%
chance A would still not have graduated had A attended University Y.
If, on the other hand, University X had a 60% graduation rate while University Y had a 90% graduation rate, A should be able to recover the full value of the
degree, because there is a 75% probability that A's failure to graduate was due to
A's failure to attend University Y.
82. See CALAmA~i & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 14-10 at 605.
83. To mitigate this problem, plaintiffs who cannot satisfy the "but for" test
will likely instead seek to void the contract, by arguing the university had a duty to
disclose its graduation rates but failed to do so.
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control," perhaps by denigrating the accuracy of the statistics as applied to an individual potential student-athlete or by offering a potential student-athlete special assistance to improve his or her
chances of graduation, their universities may be liable on a cause of
action sounding in contract.
While recognizing that universities and student-athletes have a
contractual relationship,8 4 courts have been hesitant to inquire into
an institution's performance of its contractual duties.8 5 This hesitancy springs from many of the same concerns, especially the difficulty in crafting a standard of care, which have dissuaded courts
from recognizing "educational malpractice. '8 6 In Ross v. Creighton,8 7 however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in diversity and applying Illinois law, recognized that a deal is a deal and
held that a student-athlete may hold a university liable for breach of
contract when the university violates specific promises.8 8
The plaintiff in Ross attended Creighton University on a basketball scholarship.8 9 At the time of his admission, he was dismally
unprepared to compete in Creighton's academic environment. 90
Before accepting the scholarship, Ross, aware of his academic limitations, sought and received assurances from Creighton that he
would receive sufficient tutoring to enable him to "receive a meaningful education while at Creighton." 9 1 The plaintiff, however, did
not receive the promised tutoring.9 2 When he finally left Creighton, after exhausting his eligibility, Ross had the language skills of a
fourth-grader and the reading skills of a seventh-grader. 93 While
declining to examine the educational malpractice claims, the court
held that the plaintiff's claim that Creighton had breached its commitment to provide specific services made out a cause of action for
84. See Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972). See
also Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. See generally, Davis supra, note 4.
86. Ross, 957 F.2d at 416 (7th Cir. 1992).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 417. The court noted that Mr. Ross's "specific and narrow claim"
could be adjudicated "without second-guessing the professional judgment of the
University faculty on academic matters." Id.
89. See id.
90. "[H]e scored in the bottom fifth percentile of college-bound seniors taking the American College Test, while the average freshman admitted to Creighton
with him scored in the upper twenty-seven percent." Id. at 411.
91. Id.
92. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 411.
93. See id. at 412.
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breach of contract sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for fail94
ure to state a claim.

Combining the Act with the Ross holding places athletic
recruiters in a liability mine-field. First, some athletic recruiters will
have a strong incentive to misrepresent the data they must provide
to potential student-athletes under the Act. Secondly, they will be
under extreme pressure to make promises to reluctant recruits similar to those held actionable in Ross.
A.

Misrepresentation

Suppose that a recruiter from university X and a recruiter from
university Y are both pursuing potential student-athlete A. Both
comply with the Act. University X, however, reports a ten percent
graduation rate for student-athletes similar to A, while university Y
reports a ninety percent rate. Obviously, X's recruiter will be severely tempted to misrepresent both the significance of university
X's graduation rate and the veracity of Y's. Under what conditions
will the contract be voidable by A for misrepresentation? Misrepresentation requires: "(1) representation, (2) falsity, (3) scienter, (4)
deception, and (5) injury." 95 We will assume the element of falsity
is satisfied.
1. Representation
A specific statement of what purports to be a fact is, of course,
a representation. A representation need not, however, be a specific
statement. Any affirmative act is a representation. 9 6 If the act is

designed to hide the truth, it may result in liability for misrepresentation.

97

A representation must concern fact. A representation of opinion will not support an action for misrepresentation.9 8 "Puffery" or
"sales talk" is deemed opinion, not fact.99 Thus, a recruiter's statement that, "[w] e have the best program in the country" would probably not be actionable. This, however, is a dangerous game to play.
94. See id. at 417.
95. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 0-13 at 356 (citation omitted).
These elements are similar to those of the tort of deceit. They are, however, "far
less demanding than those necessary to make out a tort cause of action." See id.
96. See KFETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 106 at 736. Opening and reading
mail, for example, is a representation that the actor has a legal right to do so.
97. See CALAARj & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 9-20 at 367.
98. See id. § 9-17, at 361.
99. "The 'puffing rule' amounts to a seller's privilege to lie his head off, so
long as he says nothing specific. ..." KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 109 at 757.
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There is a fine line between fact and opinion; if the court's sympathies are with the plaintiff, there is little to prevent the court from
finding almost any representation relied upon was one of fact.10 0
2.

Scienter

In this context, scienter is an intent to deceive.10 1 This is not,
however, a determinative element for our purposes. Since our hypothetical representation would concern graduation rates, scienter
may be deemed material. 10 2 While a knowing and material misrepresentation will support an action for misrepresentation,1 0 3 an unknowing misrepresentation of a material fact will support an action
for mutual mistake. 10 4 In either case, the injured party may void
10 5
the contract.
3.

Deception

This element closely relates to the "puffing" rule and is essentially a question of cause-in-fact. At issue is whether the plaintiff
had a right to rely on the defendant's misrepresentation, whether
the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and whether the plaintiff was actually deceived by the misrepresentation.10 6 Modern
courts usually find, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff had a right
07
to rely on a defendant's intentional misrepresentation.1
Whether or not, however, the plaintiff actually did rely on the
misrepresentation and was deceived are questions of fact.a0 In the
100. See CALAMA~i & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 9-17, at 361.

101. See id. at 356-57. "Where the representation is made with the knowledge
of its falsity, with an intent to deceive and that it shall be acted upon in a certain
way, the scienter element of tort liability is made out." Id.
102. "Materiality exists whenever the misrepresentation would be likely to affect the conduct of a reasonable man . . ." Id. § 9-14, at 357. Since a reasonable
person attends college to get an education, graduation rates would always be
material.
103. See id.
104. See id. § 9-26, at 379.
105. See CALAMARi & PERILLO, supra note 42, § 9-26, at 379; id. § 9-23, at 373.
A discussion of the implications of a voided contract, for example, whether the
student-athlete would be required to repay to the university expenses and fees paid
on its behalf, is beyond the scope of this article.
106. See id. § 9-15, at 358.
107. See id. § 9-15, at 358-59. "It is the exceptional case today where, especially
in the face of an intentional misrepresentation relief will be denied on the ground
of the undue credulity or negligence of the defrauded party." Id.
108. See id. § 9-15, at 358. "[W]hether the party did in fact rely upon representation, it would appear that the question is preeminently a question of fact." Id.
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case of a material misrepresentation, there is a rebuttable presumption of deception and reliance. 1° 9
4. Injury
Generally, some pecuniary injury is a necessary element of a
misrepresentation cause of action. 110 Some authority indicates,
however, that in the case of a material misrepresentation, damage
will be presumed."1 ' Student-athletes should be able to demonstrate injury if the graduation rates of at least one university that
recruited them were higher than the university they attended whose
recruiter made the misrepresentation. Thus, student-athlete A can
make out a claim of misrepresentation or mutual mistake whenever
X's recruiter made a misstatement about the information required
by the Act.
5.

MeasuringDamages

Once the injured party has voided the contract, restitution is
the appropriate remedy.1 1 2 Generally, restitution for services is
available in the amount of the services' fair market value. 1 3 A successful plaintiff will normally recover the reasonable value of the
services rendered. 1 14 In many instances, however, there is no market from which the reasonable value for the services might be ascertained. In the case of student-athletes, this calculation will be
problematic since there is no market from which the services of a
student-athlete may be valued. Thus, under restitution, both the
university and the student-athlete would have to return any benefits
received under the contract.
In order to determine what constitutes an appropriate remedy,
it is therefore necessary to determine what benefits were received
by each party to the contract. Some of the benefits to the studentathlete include an opportunity to attend the university (admission),
109. See id. at § 9-15, at 358-59. "A rebuttable presumption of deception and
reliance arises if the misrepresentation is material." Id.
110. Note, however, that this pecuniary injury is not the amount of the plaintiffs recovery. It is merely a necessary element to make out a cause of action in
misrepresentation, thus rendering the contract voidable by the injured party. See
id. § 9-16 at 359-360.
111. See CALxmv
& PERILLO, supra note 42 § 9-16, at 360. "A frequently cited
case stated that whenever misrepresentation is material, damage will be presumed." Id.
112. See id. § 9-23, at 373-75.
113. See DOBBS, supra note 39, § 12.18, at 428. In some cases, consequential
benefits may also be available to plaintiffs seeking restitution. See id. at 431.
114. See id.
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partial or full scholarship (funds) and a forum in which to showcase
their athletic abilities for professional recruiters. Benefits attributable to the university include improving the quality of the athletic
team. The implications and subsequent economic benefits derived
from this benefit must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis, depending on the success of the athletic team. Nevertheless, these
types of benefits may be difficult to attach a monetary value to,
thereby making the damages issue of the new tort problematic.
Although there is no bright-line rule, perhaps student-athletes
could look to cases with contract valuation issues for professional
athletes for guidance.
B.

Breach of Contract

If X's recruiter does not misrepresent X's graduation rates, the
recruiter may come under considerable pressure from the parents
of a prospective student-athlete, if not from all the parties to whom
the information is required to be distributed.1 1 5 Assuming that
these parties wish to see the student-athlete receive an education,
they will be justifiably concerned that only one in ten student-athletes similarly situated to A ever graduates. Quite likely, these parties will seek specific assurances from the university that the
student-athlete will actually receive an education. Under the Ross
holding, these types of specific promises would be enforceable
against X. Failure to fulfill them would be a breach of contract and
could trigger significant liability.
V.

DEFENSES UNDER THE ACT

Just as the Act gives, the Act also takes away. The Act provides
that:
The Secretary shall waive the requirements of this subsection for any institution of higher education that is a member of an athletic association or athletic conference that
has voluntarily published completion or graduation rate
data or has agreed to publish data that, in the opinion of
the Secretary, is substantially comparable to the informa116
tion required under this subsection.
On its face, this section of the Act appears to prove that by
obtaining a waiver from the Secretary, the institution would be ex115. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (2) (Supp. V 1992).

116. Id. § 1092(e) (6).
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empt from both the reporting requirement and the duty to provide
potential student-athletes with the otherwise required information.
It would be a mistake, however, to limit the interpretation of this
statute to its four corners. First, a court may construe the Act to
require a university to disclose the information directly to prospective student-athletes even if a waiver has been granted. Second,
under some circumstances, common law doctrines could operate to
require disclosure, regardless of whether a university has obtained a
waiver.
A.

Scope of the Waiver

In passing the Act, Congress sought to ensure that potential
student-athletes would have "knowledge of graduation rates" sufficient to allow them to "make an informed judgment about the educational benefits available at a given institution of higher education."'117 To effectuate this intent, the Act contains three types of
provisions: reporting provisions detailing what information a university must compile, 1 18 disclosure provisions detailing who must receive the information 1 9 and publication provisions. 120 Of these,
the reporting and disclosure provisions are central to the legislative
purpose, while the publication requirement is largely peripheral.
To illustrate, suppose the Act contained no publication requirement but strictly required all universities to disclose graduation rates to prospective student-athletes. Even though no single,
comprehensive source existed, prospective student-athletes would
always have sufficient information on recruiting universities' graduation rates from which they could make an "informed judgment"
about which university to attend.
By contrast, suppose the Act required only publication without
specifying (as the Act does not) how the information must be published. Hypothetically, an athletic conference could choose to comply by publishing the information in a series of legal notices in a
newspaper in American Samoa. This would completely subvert the
purpose of the Act; prospective student-athletes would be in no better position to make an "informed judgment" than they would be
had the Act not been passed.
117. Act of Nov. 8, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-542, § 101, 104 Stat. 2381, 2381

(1990).
118. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e)(1), (3)-(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
119. See id. § 1092(e) (2).
120. See id. § 1092(e) (5). Sub-section (6), dealing with waiver, includes a selfpublication alternative. See id. § 1092(e) (6).
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Congress could not, therefore, have reasonably intended to allow the Secretary to exempt institutions from both the reporting
requirement and the duty to provide the information to potential
student-athletes, as such an interpretation would lead to "futile resuits."1

21

Rather, the intent of Congress must have been to allow

the Secretary to waive only the duplicative governmental reporting
requirement and not the provision which requires the university to
provide the report directly to the prospective student-athlete.
The structure of the Act provides a colorable argument for this
proposition. The code section which provides for waiver "of this
122
subsection" appears at the highest subsection level in the Act.
Read strictly, then, a waiver should exempt an institution from all of
the Act's requirements. Clearly, however, an institution remains
bound by some parts of the Act, such as the requirement to collect
graduation data, even after it has received a waiver. Thus, a waiver
cannot be a blanket exemption; its scope must be determined by
some other standard. As noted above, since waiving the requirement that information be provided directly to student-athletes
would frustrate the intent of Congress, it is not within the scope of
the Act. Arguably, then, when the Secretary waives the requirements of the Act, it is only with respect to those requirements owed
to the Secretary, such as the reporting requirement.
In any event, as it is within the scope of a common law court to
recognize new duties 12 3 and thereby create new torts that have no
ground in legislative intent, 124 a court is equally free to imply a duty
out of a statute which furthers the purposes of a statute, even if the
duty goes beyond that which the statute requires. This is especially
true when the statute's technical requirements appear to defeat the
statute's fundamental purpose. Thus, a court could interpret the
Act as creating a duty to provide student-athletes with the required
5
information, even if the university had received a waiver. 12
121. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)
(stating that courts must follow purpose of legislation rather than plain meaning
when strict interpretation of statute's language would create futile or absurd

results).
122. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (6) (Supp. IV 1992).
123. The court could, for example, merely recognize a relationship between a

university and a potential student-athlete confidential per se. See KEETON ET

AL.,

supra note 19, § 106, at 738.
124. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (informed
consent); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Ca. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting) (strict liability).
125. As a practical matter, it is unlikely a court would be sympathetic to a
defendant who had obtained a waiver but had not provided the information directly to the potential student-athlete. Once the report has been compiled, the
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claim of misrepresentation,' 3 5 it will be very useful when confronted with a Ross-type claim for breach of a specific contractual
provision; 4) require potential student-athletes and their parents to
sign and return a copy of the information required by the Act. This
will provide a valuable defense against claims based on the new tort
and those based on misrepresentation.
In conclusion, the legal environment in which athletic recruiting takes place is radically different from what it was even five years
ago. Student athletes now have potential causes of action sounding
in both tort and contract, should they be unable to complete their
college educations. Nor is the Act and the Ross decision aberrations. Rather, they are manifestations of a trend. Both Congress
and the courts have shed much of the deference they had previously accorded educational institutions. Growing numbers of student athletes are likely to take advantage of this more favorable
climate and seek legal redress. Consequently, this altered climate
requires every university to take immediate steps to immunize its
athletic recruiting program from potential liability.
135. See CALAmmP & PERILLO, supranote 42, § 9-21, at 371. "A general merger
clause is not deemed to bar parol evidence of misrepresentation, but a specific
merger clause disclaiming specific representation is deemed to bar such evidence."

Id.
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